The paradox of globalization: the quest for citizenship in a globalized world

1. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE CREATION OF THE PRECARIAT

This paper is based on the research of Dani Rodrik summarized in his book: "The globalization paradox. Why global markets, states and democracy can't coexist?"[1]

In this book he scrutinises the globalization of the economy. The characteristics of the globalization since the eighties are the opening of the borders for trade, for investment in production and for capital. All hindrances for especially free trade and for free movement of capital are one by one cleaned up. Globalization means opening up the borders of the country for foreign investment and trade without restrictions (tax restrictions and others). He compares the results or consequences of the globalization in different countries. Countries who didn't open up their borders are taken into account.

His conclusion is very critical about the gains of free trade and free movement of capital. Countries who have welcomed the globalization agenda like Argentine have paid a severe price for the implementation of this agenda. Other countries like the core EU member states experienced major benefits, but also a lot of losses. These countries have lost a huge amount of manufacturing (from steel to textile, from cars to IT) or have seen disappear competition of their own workforce and see their labour regulations threatened by social dumping. Being attractive to foreign investment meant also tax competition, competition on labour regulations, health and environmental regulations, and so on.

His conclusion is that since it is not at all clear how we can decide whether a country as a whole is better off while some people gain and other lose, the notion of "gains of trade" is suspect. People who lose are those who suffer directly from this severe competition.

He emphasizes that the losses disadvantaged groups have are not transitory. There is no trade-off between those who gain and those who lose. Only redistribution by the state of the 'gains of trade' can provide solace. This is key in his research. Social protection schemes are a necessary complement of the globalization, but they are threatened by that same globalization. The globalization even changes the nature of the welfare state. Social protection, labour market policies, welfare institutions like health care have been distorted and commodified. The results of the RE-InVEST-project are quite disturbing. The welfare state has been driven away from its initial goals.

Unfortunately, the disadvantaged groups are not in the cockpit of the construction of transnational politics. The globalization agenda is a project of the globalized elite attuned largely to their needs, says Dani Rodrik.

1.1. Who are these disadvantaged groups?

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[1] Dani Rodrik. The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. New York and London: W.W. Norton; 2011

Guy Standing[2] defined these disadvantaged groups as the precariat. The precariat is the condition of a lack of job security, including intermittent employment or underemployment and the resultant precarious existence. The analysis of the results of the Great British Class Survey of 2013[3], a collaboration between the BBC and researchers from several UK universities, contended there is a new model of class structure consisting of seven classes, ranging from the Elite at the top to the Precariat at the bottom. The Precariat class was envisaged as "the most deprived British class of all with low levels of economic, cultural and social capital". The Precariat class is the opposite of "the Technical Middle Class": instead of having money but no interests, people of the new Precariat Class have all sorts of potential activities they like to engage but are not able to do any of them because they have no money, insecure lives, and are usually trapped in old industrial parts of the country.

The precariat is the left behind people, people who don't receive the gains of the globalization, caught in their, from industry deserted, regions.

The precariat is more than the unemployed people. Globalisation, the digital revolution, changing work patterns (life work balance and globalisation as a driver of change) and increasingly diverse types of work have an impact on labour markets. Careers are becoming less and less linear, with people transiting between different employment statuses and/or combining salaried employment and self-employment[4].

The precariat is also the mobile jobseeker who competes with the national workforce. A competition between mostly low skilled people starts with a negative effect on national wages.

What unites these groups is the need for a (generous) social protection. A social protection that is nowadays under pressure of the globalisation.

1.2. Vulnerability and the Precariat

The discussion about the Precariat, those who are left behind, opens the debate on the concept of vulnerability.

In a general context, vulnerability can be understood as a state of defencelessness against an adverse shock that could inflict damage to an agent or system (person, household, economy, financial system, climate system, etc.). Consequently, a state of vulnerability can be characterized either by the presence of certain weaknesses or internal conditions inherent to the agent or system in question (which determines their state of defencelessness), or by the presence of certain probable external shocks, to which the agent or system does not have the ability to cope.[5] Vulnerable people are defined as people who are defenceless. The focus lies here on their own weaknesses. This is a rather a unilateral view on Man.

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[2] Guy Standing (May 24, 2011). "The Precariat – The new dangerous class". Policy Network.
[3] Mike Savage and Fiona Devine (April 3, 2013). "The Great British Class Survey – Results". BBC Science. Retrieved April 7, 2013
[4] See Steering note. Hearing with the civil society on a possible EU action addressing the challenges of access to social protection for people in all forms of employment in the framework of the European Pillar of Social Rights. http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=9001&furtherNews=yes
[5]Mauricio Gallardo. IDENTIFYING VULNERABILITY TO POVERTY: A CRITICAL SURVEY. Journal of Economic Surveys(2017) https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12216

From an anthropological point of view[6], we can describe man as a receiver, doer and judge. Man is a receiver. He needs care from the beginning till the end. He needs protection, social protection. He is dependent from others. He is thus in essence a receiver. But Man is more than a receiver. Human beings must also be seen as actors, who can flourish in a plurality of ways, including through work, artistic activities, community involvement, etc. And human beings are also political beings (the faculty of judging): they have the capability to aspire, they can evaluate, they are citizens whose voice counts, interested in participating to the deliberation of the common good. With these three concepts the anthropological richness of the person can be described. It accentuates the multidimensionality and the indivisibility of the three concepts.

A complex, multidimensional and dynamic conception of vulnerability is thus the consequence. A person is vulnerable when he has no protection, or can't work and when his voice is not heard. People who are extremely vulnerable when they don't receive protection, can't work and have no voice. The last dimension is the most important: people who still have a voice even if they have no protection or no work, aren't vulnerable. They can raise their voice and have political influence. People who have no voice, but don't miss protection or work are extremely dependent of others and defenceless to external shocks.

1.3. The precariat as those with limited agency.

The discussion about vulnerability opens the definition of the precariat. Where Guy Standing and the British Class Survey accentuate the economic and social conditions of people, the above discussion focusses on the dimension of voice. Lacking a voice, even if having a vote, results in being vulnerable or being in the precariat.

To be voice-less results in not being able to change the situation in where he lives. Using the vocabulary of the Capability approach, we could also use the term agency to describe the voice-lessnes.

Sen's definition of an agent is 'someone who acts and brings about change and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we asses them in terms of some external criteria as well'.[7]

Voiceless people don't have the freedom to act or to bring change in their own situation.

With Ruth Lister we can distinct three elements that are useful for analysing agency in poverty and in a situation of precariat [8]:

- the focus on agency of individuals when considering the ways in which agency is constrained by living conditions and power structures
- the understanding of social mobility as the result of individual actions but also of economic, social and political processes
- The distinction between strategic and everyday agency that is in line with the distinction of household strategies as reasoned activities and routine.

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[6] Jean-Michel Bonvin, RE-InVEST
[7] A. Sen, Development as freedom, Oxford, 1999 pag 19
[8] Lister, R. (2004). Poverty (Key Concepts). Cambridge: Polity Press

Agency can be then described on the personal level and in an everyday situation. Here we can speak of adaptation. Adaptation is the classified as agency of "getting by", a kind of everyday agency on the personal level. In contrast to strategic agency, adaptation does not involve the intention of change in the long term, and in contrast to political/citizenship agency, it does not have an intended aim for society either. Adaptation helps one 'to get by' through improving subjective well-being without changing living conditions and power structures. The following illustration shows the conceptualization of agency according to Ruth Lister. At the other side of the circle strategic agency is shown. Through 'getting organized' people can change their everyday situation by changing living conditions and power structures. In the 'getting at', you invoke power structures about your living conditions; here you are asking them what they really mean. This in contrast with the situation on the personal level, where people can 'getting by', like an older person who adapts himself to his own handicapped situation, or 'getting out', like an unemployed person who becomes an independent worker.

The precariat are thus people who have a limited agency on the strategic and on the political level. This corresponds with our notion of the voiceless people.

1.4. To conclude

Dani Rodrik emphasized the consequences of the globalization for the disadvantaged people. He didn't circumscribed this group. With Guy Standing we defined this group as the precariat. These are the most deprived class of all with low levels of economic, cultural and social capital. This description starts from a rather unidimensional view of Man. We broaden are definition of Man from a view of the CA. With the broader definition we accentuated the capacity to have voice. To have voice is to be able to act. Agency becomes the criteria. With Ruth Lister we limited the agency to political agency.

The precariat is the class with low levels of economic, cultural and social capital and with a limited political agency.

2. THE NATION STATE AS THE BEARER OF WELFARE STATE AND RIGHTS

Social protection is a national competence. The Nation States are responsible for the wellbeing of their citizens. Dany Rodrik accentuates in his book that the social protection schemes are created and developed between the walls of this Nation State, namely during the period of strongly regulated globalisation (from the first world war on till the eighties). It is the period where the democratic infrastructure and culture is installed together with the development of the social protection schemes. Social protection and democratic culture are faces of the same coin.

At the same time it is the period where citizenship containing social and political rights is in fully development.

Zolberg (2000) describes the birth of citizenship as 'the hypernationalist version of citizenship', leading to the 'nationalization of rights'. National citizenship became linked to obligations, notably to men's duty to perform military service.

The end of the Second World War led to an advance in the framework of rights, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and a spate of international documents, including the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, while asserting universal rights, these reflected the conventional link between rights and national citizenship.

Thus the Universal Declaration (Article 13) interprets the right to freedom of movement as the right to emigrate – to leave a country – but not a right to immigrate – to enter a country. Zolberg (2000) outlines how the construction of citizenship is linked to a particular understanding of national belonging and identity. These understandings 'provided the underpinnings for widespread acceptance of a conceptualization of citizenship grounded in a global system of mutually exclusive State jurisdictions. Zolberg further asserts that the hyper-national versions of citizenship required nations-states to police the conditions to entry closely and to secure the borders of the nations-states against foreign populations. It is in this respect that immigration itself became and remains central to the exercise for state sovereignty.

2.1. The distortion of rights[9]

T. H. Marshall (1950)[10], writing after the Second World War, has defined citizenship as 'a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community'. To be a citizen meant having 'an absolute right to a certain standard of civilisation which is conditional only on the discharge of the general duties of citizenship'. While Marshall's later conception of the 'duties of citizenship' included a duty to labour, he recognized the tension between rights and capitalism, noting that 'in the twentieth century, citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war.' Citizenship imposed modifications on the capitalist class system, since social rights 'imply an invasion of contract by

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[9] Guy Standing. A Precariat Charter. From Denizens to Citizens. 2014.
[10] T.H. Marshall. Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays. 1950

status, the subordination of market price to social justice, the replacement of the free bargain by the declaration of rights.'

That was roughly correct in they are-embedded' phase of Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation (1944], the period of social-democrat supremacy between 1944 and the 1970s. In the subsequent 'disembedded' phase, contract has invaded status, and social justice has been subordinated to the market price.

This transformation of rights is most visible if we look at the social rights. Social rights are after all a kind of special rights, driven by a social liberal consensus (Hartley Dean, 2015). "In part this was an uneasy consensus between factions within liberalism: right-leaning economic liberals who broadly favoured 'negative' rights within liberalism had to concede to left-leaning social liberals who were prepared, reluctantly perhaps, to countenance positive rights. However the consensus has also to embrace traditional conservative and moderate socialist opinions and to temper the authoritarian excesses of political utilitarianism."[11] Social rights as an uneasy consensus are an easily target for those who want to change them. On the neo-liberal agenda we find the reorienting of the social rights into another direction.

The distortion of rights can be seen as a tension between different rights or different implementations of rights: f.e. the tension between freedom as an individualistic right versus the freedom to associate. Examples of this distortion is the right to work versus the right to strike, resulting in the condemnation of striking. Other examples are the transformation of the right to work into the duty to work, or the right to have social protection into the duty to fulfil the conditionality's of social protection,

The 'dis-embedded' phase is characterized by hyperglobalization: the Washington Consensus[12] imposed a 'neoliberal' agenda of free trade, privatization and less government. Hannah Arendt in the Origins was very clear about the perverse relation between globalization and democracy. She uses the term imperialism to circumscribe globalization: "the concept of unlimited expansion that alone

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[11] Hartley Dean. Social rights and human welfare. Routledge, 2015, page 46

[12] The consensus as originally stated by John Williamson included ten broad sets of relatively specific policy recommendations:
- Fiscal policy discipline, with avoidance of large fiscal deficits relative to GDP;
- Redirection of public spending from subsidies ("especially indiscriminate subsidies") toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment;
- Tax reform, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates;
- Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms;
- Competitive exchange rates;
- Trade liberalization: liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs;
- Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment;
- Privatization of state enterprises;
- Deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions;
- Legal security for property rights

Williamson, John: What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in: Williamson, John (ed.): Latin American Readjustment: How Much has Happened, Washington: Institute for International Economics 1989

can fulfil the hope for unlimited accumulation of capital, and brings about the aimless accumulation of power, makes the foundation of new political bodies well-nigh impossible. In fact, its logical consequence is the destruction of all living communities, those of the conquered peoples, as well as of the people at home. For every political structure, new or old, left to itself develops stabilizing forces, which stand in the way of constant transformation and expansion. Therefore all political bodies appear to be temporary obstacles when they are seen as part of an eternal stream of growing power?"[13]

2.2. The right to have rights versus rightlessness

Hannah Arendt has always been critical about Human Rights[14]. Following Burke she emphases that Human Rights are always linked with the nation state. "Modern people know even better than Burke that all rights materialize only within a given community.'(1951, page 269) Arendt, however, redirects Burke's argument about the timelessness of the nation state to consider the futility of human rights in the face of mass statelessness. The stark fact of the widespread statelessness demonstrates that human rights are not natural or primary rights. The moment when humans should have been in possession of their human rights, stripped as they are of all other legal entitlements and reduced to the status of 'natural' man, the utter lack of authority supporting those rights is revealed (Stephanie DeGooyer, 2018)[15].

For Arendt rights have been historically achieved through the framework of the nation-state. While the nation-state has created rights-bearing status for some individuals, its linking with nationality of rights-bearing status means that is has also and at the same time produced a situation of precarity and even caused the loss of rights-bearing status for others. For Arendt 'rightlessness' is inherent with the conception of Human Rights. The grounding of Human Rights in the 'nature' of man, puts the position of individuals on a political hierarchy as a function of birth. It cannot be retraced to any human deed. She makes this clear with the comparison to slavery. "Slavery's crime against humanity did not begin when one people defeated and enslaved its enemies, but when slavery became an institution in which some men were born 'free' (having rights) and other slave, when it was forgotten that it was man who have deprived his fellow-men of freedom, and when the sanction for the crime was attributed to nature"[16].

The nation-state as bearer of rights is now under pressure of the globalization. Dani Rodrik, like Hannah Arendt, sees a limited role of the state in the era of globalization. Defining who is entitled as a citizen is the main task of the nation-state. Identity has become the main political topic of this century. The consequence is that more than ever people are transformed from bearers of Human Rights into people without rights or restricted rights.

2.3. Denizens and restricted rights

Guy Standing characterises people with restricted rights as denizens. We find this concept already in In the Middle Ages. Jewish people were mostly denizens, but also market traders (see also Laurence

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[13] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), pag 137
[14] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951)
[15] Stephanie DeGooyer, in The right to have rights, Verso, 2018, page 34
[16] Hannah Arendt, ibid, pag 297

Fontaine[17]). In England, a denizen was an outsider – an 'alien' – who was granted by the king, or an authority operating on his behalf, the right to settle and to work in a town in his proven occupation. He gained some of the rights of a citizen of the town, but rarely all of them and not necessarily forever.

This idea of denizenship as an 'in-between' status has historically been one of progress for the person involved. A denizen was someone who moved from being an outsider to a partial insider, with some rights. But denizenship should be seen as regress as well. In the globalization era, while the rhetoric of rights gained force and popularity, the reality has been the conversion of more people into denizens, denied certain rights or prevented from obtaining or retaining them. This does not affect only migrants. If Hannah Arendt's idea of citizenship is 'the right to have rights' (Arendt 1951), today it would be better to think of citizenship as a continuum, with many people having a more limited range of rights than others, without any simple dichotomy of citizen and non-citizen.

Until the 1980s, the conventional view was that over the long run, in a democratic society, residence and citizenship should coincide (Brubaker 1989). This view has turned today. Many residing in a country never obtain citizenship or the rights attached to it; others who have resided since birth lose rights that supposedly go with citizenship.

It is in this sense that most migrants are denizens – people with a more limited range of rights than citizens. But they are not the only group that fall into this category. The reality is that in the globalization era more people are being converted into denizens, through losing rights.

Denizenship is thus not only a possible characteristic of migrants or asylum seekers, everyone who have not the opportunity to achieve 'a certain standard of civilisation' (T. H. Marshall) are also denizens. If there is not enough decent work or social protection is weak f.e., people lose their right to have a decent life.

Historically, a denizen was granted citizenship rights on sufferance, on demonstration of worthiness, which was a matter of discretion by or on behalf of the ruler. Modern denizens are in a similar position. A denizen can also be seen as someone subject to 'unaccountable domination', that is, domination by others whose conduct cannot be held to account. This domination is a main characteristic of the distortion of rights: rights have become duties.

In sum, denizenship arises from an unbundling of rights that removes some or all of the rights nominally attached to formal citizenship. The neo-liberalism that crystallized in the globalization era has generated a 'tiered membership' model of society.

2.4. A globalized view on denizenship

Globalization pushes the debate on citizenship into a direction of global denizenship.

A tension emerges between universal human rights, which should apply equally to everybody, and the idea of rights embodied in citizenship, confined to people with a certain status. Rights in the modern era have been depicted as 'melting' with citizenship (Bobbio 1990)[18], with citizenship coming

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[17] Laurence Fontaine, Le Marché, histoire et usages d'une conquête sociale. Galliamard, 2014

[18] Noberto Bobbio, The Age of Rights, 1990

to be defined as belonging to an entity (usually a sovereign nation) and entitlement to rights seen as a function of that belonging.

Rights are thus seen as a badge of citizenship, and only citizens have all the rights established in their own country. A full citizen has access to five types of rights – civil, political, cultural, social and economic – as recognized by the 1966 Covenants and by regional equivalents stemming from the Universal Declaration[19].

A human right is universal, applying to everyone. However, as emphasized by Bobbio (1990) and others, the Nation State is not the only form of association for generating rights. Most of us belong to associations that establish and enforce individual and group rights within specific communities. A right is what is granted to those who join and remain good members of a club. That perspective produces an image of layers of citizenship and layers of rights. So we can think, for example, of occupational citizenship, implying that some have a 'right to practise' a set of activities with designated titles, such as doctor, lawyer, carpenter or baker, along with a right to receive income, benefits, status and representation or agency – rights developed and legitimized within an occupation, often over generations, as in the legal and medical professions.

The Nation State as an association for generating rights is complemented by other associations: the United Nations have designed a framework of Human Rights, the European Union guarantees the implementation of these rights, local governments create new rights (entitlements) for their citizens, … There is even a competition between these associations how to implement these rights. The Pillar of Social Rights can be seen as an equalizer of interpretations of rights or as creating a level playing field in Europe.

The idea of a continuum of rights, or layers of citizenship and layers of rights is a consequence of the globalization era.

2.5. The right to aspire

The right to have rights (Arendt, 1959) forces us to pay attention to the demos where the rights mostly by struggle were born. Rights are not something we either possess or don't. Rather, they are claims intended to produce effects and change the course of events, legal and moral tools with which we can shape reality. Rights, then, demand not just thinking, but acting, not just individual declaration but communal, cooperative assertion.

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[19] The main types of rights:
* Civil rights include the right to life and liberty, a fair trial, due process, equality before the law, legal representation, privacy and freedom of expression, and the right to be treated with equal dignity.
* Cultural rights are rights of individuals and communities to access and participate in their chosen culture, including language and artistic production, in conditions of equality, dignity and non-discrimination.
* Political rights include the right to vote, participate in political life, stand in elections, and participate in civil society.
* Social rights include the right to an adequate standard of living, social protection, occupational health and safety, housing, health care and education, and preservation of and access to the commons.
* Economic rights include the right to practise one's occupation, share in the economic resources of the commons, enjoy a fair share of economic growth, access all forms of income, and bargain individually and collectively.

We 'claim rights', what means rights that society should move towards realizing. As a consequence, policies and institutional changes should be judged by whether they move towards realizing rights through a process of public debate.

Thanks to this public debate rights constantly evolve, at national and international levels. For example, a Charter of Emerging Human Rights, which highlighted distributional and ecological claims, was formulated as part of the Universal Forum of Cultures (Barcelona Social Forum 2004). It made little impact, but should be revisited.

The 'right to have rights' opens a window towards a world where everyone has rights, right to really have rights. It gestures toward open-ended futurity: toward the ongoing call to create a world where all human beings can, if they like or need to, legitimately demand and claim rights (Lida Maxwell, 2018).

The 'right to have rights' are a 'right to aspire'. It is the fundament of our global citizenship. To have a right to aspire is not enough, Arjun Appadurai [20] shows that you need also the capacity to aspire. She concludes that for a full right to citizenship the necessity to invest in the capacity to aspire. She looks for arguments to answer the question how collective horizons are shaped and of how they constitute the basic for collective aspirations? One of her answers is the capacity to aspire that is essential to every human being. This capacity is linked with the capacity to have a voice.

The capacity to aspire is a navigational capacity. With this capacity you use the norms an axioms that exist in your society to explore the future frequently and realistically, and to share this knowledge with one another to build a common future. The problem now is that this capacity is unequally divided among the population; the poorer members, precisely because of their lack of opportunities to practice the use of this navigational capacity (in turn because their situations permit fewer experiments and less easy archiving of alternative futures), have a more brittle horizon of aspirations.

This capacity to aspire is linked with the faculty of voice, or the faculty of being a 'judge'. Each accelerates the nurture of the other. And the more poor in every society are caught in a situation where triggers to this positive acceleration are few and hard to access. Investing in the capacity to aspire opens a window for the precariat to build a future of rights.

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[20] Arjun Appadurai, The capacity to aspire: culture and the terms of recognition. In Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton, Culture and Public Action, Stanford, 2004

3. THE TRILEMMA OF GLOBALISATION

Dany Rodrik makes in his book a statement that we cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy and national self-determination all at once. We can have at most two out of three. If we want hyperglobalization and democracy, we need to give up the Nation State. If we must keep the Nation State and want hyperglobalization too, then we must forget about democracy. And if we want to combine democracy with the Nation State, then we must give up deep globalization.

For Dani Rodrik, democratic politics means also the quest for social protection. A democratic state must look after his citizens and especially the most vulnerable. So when he describes a democratic state, he assumes at the same time the social infrastructure.

Dani Rodrik doesn't say anything about the quest for rights and citizenship. But his questions invoke the Human Rights and citizenship: he is talking about the social and political rights of people. So we transform his trilemma using the word citizenship instead of democratic politics. A new trilemma can be shown.

Why these stark trade-offs between the three relations?

Starting with the first relation that diminishes citizenship: the relation between hyperglobalization and the Nation State. Here lays the focus on economic globalization and becoming attractive to international investors and traders. The state brings all domestic regulations (on labor market, health and environment policies, social welfare regime …) and tax policies into alignment with international standards, decided by international boards. The only task governments still have is to render services that reinforce the smooth functioning of international markets. At that moment there is no place anymore for a full implementation of citizenship. Social rights are distorted, the right to associate (trade unions f.e.) is restricted, citizens and parliaments have no voice about the distortion of domestic regulations, international boards are imposing restrictions on domestic regulations,

No wonder that more authoritarian regimes are an outcome of this relation. Authoritarian regimes that threat all democratic institutions as free press, independent justice, restrictions on associations… At the same time affects this relation more than social and political rights: it affects deeply cultural rights. Hyperglobalization threats cultural diversity, mass consumerism and mass culture come instead. Cultural identity has become a main topic. But identity is the golden calf says Peter Sloterdijk: "the dance around the golden calf of identity is the last and greatest orgy of counter-enlightenment. Identity is the magic word of a partially hidden, partially open conservatism that has inscribed personal identity, occupational identity, national identity, political identity, female identity, male identity, class identity, party identity, etc., on its banner."[21] The dance around the golden calf is headed by the Nation States. To survive hyperglobalization the Nation State must invest in cultural identity. Around the dance of the golden calf the Nation State can assemble their citizens,

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[21] Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (1983), p. 61

not as citizens but as persons belonging to the same cultural identity. Here we don't
speak any more about losers, or the precariat or l'homme inutile, but about tribes or clans.

Hyperglobalization has thus a really negative consequence for the full implementation of citizenship.
As Guy Standing writes, we must see citizenship as a continuum, with many people having a more
limited range of rights than others, without any simple dichotomy of citizen and non-citizen. In this
dilemma between the Nation State and globalization there are a lot of people who win from this
tension. We are now talking about the 'nomads' as the international elite who attunes the
globalization to their needs (D. Rodrik). The losers are 'les hommes inutiles' (Pierre-Noël Giraud,
2015) or the 'useless man' or the 'precariat' (Guy Standing)

Can we rescue citizenship? We can look at the other side of the triangle and scrutinize the relation
between hyperglobalization and citizenship. This relation questions the Nation State. But we have
already seen that there is a 'melting' of Rights with citizenship (Bobbio 1990), with citizenship coming
to be defined as belonging to an entity and entitlement to rights seen as a function of that belonging.
If we want to rescue citizenship then we must look for another entity that can entitle you to rights.

This entity must be found on a global scale with global governance. But is global governance
possible?

This is for D. Rodrik a rhetoric question. There is too much diversity in the world to find answers and
solution in common, global rules. For D. Rodrik, global standards and regulations are not just
impractical; they are undesirable. The reason is that global governance will result in the lowest
common denominator; a regime of weak and ineffective rules. More, the question remains
unanswered how democratic global governance will be. Universal citizenship will only be a shadow of
the national citizenship. Here too we must question the possibility of universal cultural citizenship.
The threat of mass consumerism is obvious.

The need of smaller entities, like Nation States will always pop up and will be a menace of global
governance.

And so we come to the last relation: limiting the hyperglobalization to save citizenship.

Dani Rodrik shows convincingly why restricting hyperglobalization can save citizenship. A historical
analyses of the last century shows obviously that citizenship has developed between the walls of the
Nation State, protected from free trade without limits and hyperglobalization. During the Bretton
Woods regime we limited the globalization by strict rules while in the mean time we allowed global
trade, global trade under restricted rules. Most developing countries limit globalization in order to
create a kind of welfare regime. Countries like Korea, Japan, European countries, the USA, did the
same earlier and created a social welfare regime between the walls of Bretton Woods structure.
Today China plays a game of limiting globalization and allowing global trade and at the same time
creating a Chinese model of welfare state.

Dani Rodrik instigates on restricting hyperglobalization to protect citizenship. The consequence is
that the Nation State must be upgraded.

4. WHAT ABOUT EUROPE?

We can use the above trilemma to clarify the dilemmas of the European Union.

The European Union is a kind of supranational State, it has taken a lot of the competences of the Nation States. One of the most important competences of the Nation States is the regulation on migration. Europe has partly taken over this competence.

But Europe is more, it is also an actor of globalization. Free trade, free movement of capital, free movement of persons, … EU has fulfilled most of the Washington consensus rules. So we have to redraw the trilemma of D. Rodrik to describe the dilemmas of Europe.

It is important to remember that the original trilemma remains. Each member state feels the same challenges from hyperglobalization as other non-European countries. What has changed is that there is a supranational government above the Member States that fulfils two tasks, as a State and as an actor of globalization. This means that Member States undergo two actors of globalization. The diagram shows three triangles: one triangle with the Nation State, hyperglobalization and citizenship (NHC); a second triangle with Europe, hyperglobalization and citizenship (EHC), and a third one with the Nation State, Europeanization and citizenship (NEC). These three triangles are superimposed and influence at the same time.

The first triangle (NHC) is already discussed above. The Welfare State under the pressure of hyperglobalization has been reformed. This has happened without much democratic debate. A more authoritarian regime has developed prohibiting democratic debate (Spain with his anti-demonstration measures is one example). At the same time to reconcile citizens with the Nation State there is more emphasis on identity and belonging. All countries have discussed last years what values and norms form the cultural background of their country (cauliflower in white sauce belongs in Flanders to their cultural background). This resulted also in a stricter migration policy. The identity discussion comes not surprisingly back as a boomerang: discussions about identity opens the door for breaking national identities: Spain, UK, France, and other countries are the best examples of this cultural and identity pursuit.

The second triangle (EHC) is about the double face of Europe: as an actor in hyperglobalization but also as a supranational State. As a supranational State it has developed a European Welfare regime. This regime is developed in debate with the Member States, social partners, civic organizations and the European parliament. Measures about food security, ecological constraints, save labour constraints, gender equality, and even the pursuit of a social Europe are examples of the growing of a supranational State. The pursuit for a more democratic Europe finds here his origin.

As a developing supranational State Europe puts restrictions on hyperglobalization. All described measures put restrictions on free trade: restrictions on food (cows with hormones and chicken with chlorine) are the best known.

At the same time Europe is also an actor of hyperglobalization. Europe is built on the free trade and free movement of persons and capital between the walls of Europe. This form of hyperglobalization between the walls was always countered by the elaboration of the supranational State. Since the economic crisis, the neoliberal agenda has become dominant. The hyperglobalization agenda has

been imposed by the European leaders. There was even no alternative possible: TINA was the slogan. This hyperglobalization agenda was imposed on a very authoritarian way: a real discussion wasn't possible, the European Council took the lead of the reform, and the European Central Bank has received new competences beyond their legal frame. Member States have to bow for the different imposed reforms. Al these reforms have changed labour regulations (restrictions on labour negotiations, lower minimum wages, flexibility of work, …) , changed health care and other social regulations (cuts in social expenditure), have introduced privatization, changed social protection into protection on conditions (activation), … . The economic crisis has been the lubricant for the hyperglobalization agenda. It is important to remember how undemocratic all these measures were taken. The democratic deficit of Europe is since the economic crisis tangible.

One example of the hyperglobalization agenda of Europe was the discussion about the TTIP: the debates on TTIP were held after closed doors, between technocrats, and even parliamentary control wasn't allowed. The TTIP showed even more than the economic crisis the democratic deficit.

The double face of Europe can be found in the so-called 'social investment package': at the same time it is an attempt to develop a common ground for a welfare regime and it is (more than) an attempt to introduce in the social policies of the Member States rules of efficiency (meaning cuts in social expenditure), privatization, and activation ('domination is a main characteristic of the distortion of rights: rights have become duties').

The problem with the democratic deficit is that it is unclear who has imposed the hyperglobalization agenda. The European Council are the leaders of the Member States, the European Commission is the executor of the measures decided by the Council. But at the same time the European Union has his own hyperglobalization agenda. The two triangles have fallen together here.

The third triangle (NEC) shows the disputes between the Member States and the European Union. These disputes are centred on following questions: who takes the lead, who represents the citizens?

This triangle takes the place of the Member States in consideration. If there is a real supranational State with real democratic features, then the role of the Member State is fading. The migration crisis is one example of this dispute. The unilateral decisions of Member States to introduce tax reductions are another example. Each time it is a dispute about the competence of the Nation State versus the supranational State.

This dispute is influenced by the first triangle: each Member State competes with the other to win the hyperglobalization.

The emphasis on identity and belonging has tightened this dispute. The Brexit is one example of this discussion. In other countries we see the same tendencies: in multiple countries anti-European parties and anti-European feelings (the discussion in the parliament of the Netherlands about the flag of Europe is exemplary: all parties except the Green party didn't want to have the flag of Europe in their parliament) are rising.

The emphasis on identity and belonging doesn't enrich the discussion about the democratic deficit in the Member States. As already shown, this emphasis is mostly translated into more authoritarian policies.

At the same time the Member States are investing in more Europe. Europe has the potential to build a European welfare regime against or next to the hyperglobalization agenda. The Pillar of Social Rights is an example of a common ground for a common European welfare regime. With the pursuit for more social Europe, European leaders are looking for solving the democratic deficit. The quest for a more democratic Europe stays on the forefront. Going further in his direction, the question remains what about the Nation State? And if the supranational State becomes more influential, the question of identity and culture will rise.

5. CHALLENGES FOR CITIZENSHIP

With T.H. Marshall we defined citizenship as 'an absolute right to a certain standard of civilisation which is conditional only on the discharge of the general duties of citizenship'. Under hyperglobalization the notion of citizenship has be distorted. Rights became duties, some people have less rights than others, and some people has only a small access to rights. Citizenship is becoming a continuum to be excluded from rights (rightlessness) over denizenship to full citizenship.

With hyperglobalization political rights, social rights and even cultural rights have been restricted. The above mentioned continuum must show the realization of the different rights, together they show if a person has full citizenship.

Where today denizenship is seen in decline, a more positive view on denizenship is possible. Denizenship could be seen as a stepping stone towards full citizenship, like it was in the middle ages. The question is now how we can build stepping stones towards full citizenship? One strategy is building on the capacity to aspire and voice. People with less rights, the precariat, must regain their voice, their capacity to aspire. Another strategy is building on economic rights: Laurence Fontaine [22]makes clear that the market is an instrument equalizing denizens and citizens. In her book she accentuates the social effects of the market and gives examples of the equalizing force of the market through micro-credits.

The development of Europe has the potential to withstand the hyperglobalization and the negative evolution of citizenship. The pillar of social rights could be a stepping stone towards full citizenship. This means that Europe has to invest in the capacities for voice and aspiration. This also means that Europe must really go for a real social Europe and full citizenship.

This potential has to solve questions about the democratic deficit: is a 'European public space' really possible?[23] Another question is what about the variety in welfare regimes (still a national

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[22] Laurence Fontaine, Le Marché, op cit

[23] See for example John R. Parkinson in 'Does Democracy Require Physical Public Space?' in 'Does Truth Matter? Democracy and Public Space', Editors Raf Geenens en Ronald Tinnevelt.
" When political theorists discuss public space they generally take it to be a metaphor that refers to the myriad ways in which citizens separated in time and space can participate in collective deliberation, decision-making and action, a concept interchangeable with 'the public realm' or 'the public sphere'. Thus 'public space' is taken by many to refer to things like the media, the internet, and networks of citizens in civil society, such that "the literal meaning has almost been wiped out". This shift has taken place for good reasons. From the standpoint of democratic theory, the issues are scale and complexity. The members of large-scale, complex societies cannot all gather together in a physical forum to argue, deliberate and decide. Yet they need to participate in public debate in some way if that society is to be called democratic, even if only to debate their choice of representatives. But while the pursuit of metaphorical conceptions of public space is clearly a worthwhile endeavour, and one that is doing much to broaden conceptions of democracy, I think it would be a pity to wipe

competence) in Europe? Is convergence possible on a short term? What about solidarity?

How do you govern a multitude of cultures, identities and languages? Is subsidiarity an answer to this question? What about the multiple interpretations of rights and duties? Is European full citizenship possible?

This potential has to answer the threats by the first (NHC) and the third triangle (NEC) as mentioned already.

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out the literal meaning. Physical public space matters to democracy, and that neglecting the physical can have detrimental consequences for a democratic society's health".